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Abstract- Most commercial Fraud Detection components of Internet banking systems use some kind of hybrid setup 
usually comprising a Rule-Base and an Artificial Neural Network. Such rule bases have been criticised for a lack of 
innovation in their approach to Knowledge Acquisition and maintenance. Furthermore, the systems are brittle; they have
no way of knowing when a previously unseen set of fraud patterns is beyond their current knowledge. This limitation may 
have far reaching consequences in an online banking system. This paper presents a viable alternative to brittleness in 
Knowledge Based Systems; a potential milestone in the rapid detection of unique and novel fraud patterns in Internet 
banking. The experiments conducted with real online banking transaction log files suggest that Prudent based fraud 
detection may be a worthy alternative in online banking. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, banks do not publicise specific details 
of their Fraud Detection (FD) systems [1]. Despite 
this fact, there have recently been a number of 
software vendors who publicised some information 
about their Internet banking FD tools and the market 
share of such tools in commercial banks worldwide.
For example, the Proactive Risk Manager (PRM) was 
reported to be used by the top 20 banks in the world 
and in more than 40 countries [2]. Similarly, the SAS 
Fraud Management system is reportedly used in debit 
and credit card FD solutions at more than 43000 
online banking sites [3]. Although the information 
publicised is relatively simplified and primarily 
released for marketing purposes, the details exposed 
give a good indication of the generic architecture 
used by commercial banks to detect fraud in online 
banking transactions. This research has found out 
from different software vendors’ white papers that 
there is a consistent use of a combination of a Rule-
Based System (RBS) with an Artificial Neural 
Network (ANN). The Falcon Fraud Manager, a 
payment card fraud detection tool comprises an RBS 
and ANN as its main components [4]. The PRM 
white paper likewise reports that the PRM 
debit/credit card and internet banking system uses a 
hybrid structure featuring an RBS and ANN [2]. In a 
similar fashion, the SAS Fraud Management system’s 
architecture is reported to mainly include an RBS and 
an ensemble of Self Organising Neural Networks 
(SONNA) [3].
The RBS approaches employed by the FD systems 
profiled earlier have been criticised on a number of 
aspects. One of the disapprovals is based on the 
knowledge acquisition bottleneck phenomenon, 
where the process of transferring knowledge to an ES 
is indirect (involves an expert and knowledge 
engineer), labour intensive and usually restricted to a 
specific context [5]. Maintenance in these systems 
has also been described as laborious, costly and 
difficult [6], [5]. This is because a typical adjustment 
in such an RBS would involve a knowledge engineer 
and the domain expert. Usually if the original 
knowledge acquisition involved an expert and a 
knowledge engineer, then maintaining the system 
will require the expert to ensure that the latest 
changes do not render the old knowledge invalid. 
These factors, and the fact that maintenance in these 
cases is performed as an additional task to knowledge 
acquisition [7], make maintaining these systems a
time consuming and costly endeavour. Another main 
technical limitation of these commercial FD systems 
is that they are brittle. Brittleness occurs when a 
KBS does not realise when its knowledge is 
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inadequate for a particular case [8]. Brittleness, also 
likened to a lack of common sense in expert systems
[9] results in systems giving illogical conclusions to 
cases they have not been trained for. For online 
banking FD systems, this limitation poses a serious 
threat with a potential loss of significant amounts of 
money.
Ripple Down Rules (RDR) was introduced in around 
1988 to counteract KA and maintenance limitations 
of traditional KBS [10]. RDR is an incremental 
technique whereby KA and maintenance are 
essentially integrated and usually not requiring the 
additional services of a knowledge engineer. RDR 
has since been used in commercial applications 
including in intelligent web browsers, help desk 
systems, online shopping systems and numerous 
more applications [11]. RDR was originally 
developed to produce single classifications but was 
extended into Multiple Class RDR (MCRDR), a 
method essentially similar to RDR but with an added 
capability to produce multiple classifications. This 
paper presents two RDR techniques previously 
unused in online banking FD applications. Rated 
MCRDR (RM) and Ripple Down Models (RDM) are 
two successful Prudence Analysis (PA) techniques.
PA is an RDR technique and was discovered as an 
alternative to KBS brittleness. A brittle KBS does not 
realise when its knowledge is inadequate for a 
particular case [8]. Consequently, a prudent KBS is 
one with a mechanism to issue warnings or alerts 
whenever a current case is beyond the system’s 
expertise. A prudent system therefore has the ability 
to signal alerts whenever it encounters a case beyond 
its range of expertise. The rest of the paper is 
arranged as follows: sections 2 and 3 explain the RM 
and RDM techniques respectively, section 4 presents 
a number of experimental results showing the 
capabilities of RM and RDM using real Internet 
banking transaction logs and section 5 concludes the 
paper.
II. RATED MCRDR (RM)
RM is a hybrid approach and combines MCRDR with 
an ANN [12]. The method’s functionality is based on 
[5]’s premise that if patterns of fired MCRDR rules 
were collected, they can provide an additional context 
about a domain. The existence of such a pattern is 
due to a conscious or subconscious relationship 
between the rules in the expert’s mind. Groups of
these patterns can then be assigned values 
representing their contribution to different particular 
tasks [5]. RM has a MCRDR output simplifying 
mechanism which decodes MCRDR conclusions into 
indexes of binary inputs for the ANN. The MCRDR 
output generally can be a set of terminating rules, or 
the classifications produced for a given case. For this 
project, the set of terminating rules was used as the 
MCRDR output for every case. This particular choice 
of MCRDR output was based on recommendations 
from [5]’s previous experiments with a range of
different outputs .The terminating rules are indexed 
and assigned a 0 or 1 value depending on whether the 
particular rule was fired for the current case or not.
Figure 1 illustrates an overview of RM.
Figure 1. RM schematic
In RM, the indexed binary set is fed into an ANN 
such that each firing terminating rule produces a 1 
input for the ANN, and a 0 input for non firing 
terminal rules. For example, in the diagram at Figure 
1, if only the first and third terminating rules fired, 
then the resulting indexed binary word would be 101
which is also the input for the ANN. The ANN uses 
two main learning approaches. If the input does not 
change (or if there are no new rules added to 
MCRDR), a standard back-propagation algorithm 
with a sigmoid thresholding function is engaged. If a 
new rule is added in MCRDR, an additional input is 
created for the ANN. Additional inputs may pose 
threats to the ANN’s learning and conservation of 
already learned information. In addressing this threat, 
new shortcut connections are introduced from the 
newly created input to each output node. These 
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shortcut connections are assigned weights that enable
the network to retain previously learned content and 
resolve to the correct class immediately [12]. The 
shortcut weights are calculated using the single step 
initialisation formula (see equation 1)
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the rate of adjustment of for the new features and 
determines how quickly the shortcut weights adjust to 
the correct output. m is the number of newly added 
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network calculated outputs and the target outputs (or 
error sum value) at an output neuron.
The ANN learns the patterns of the fired rules for 
each classification as the MCRDR generates different 
classifications. After learning, the ANN is capable of 
detecting contradictions or misclassifications from 
the MCRDR output. The prudence part of the system 
is engaged each time there are inconsistencies 
between the two components, and a warning is 
issued. The system issues a warning each time the 
MCRDR and the ANN produce different 
classification.
III. RIPPLE DOWN MODELS (RDM)
RDM has two main components, the MCRDR part 
and an outlier detection component. RDM first 
generates MCRDR outputs to the complementary 
outlier detection component. In RDM, the output 
passed to the outlier detector is not necessarily
classifications but models. A model consists of 
situated profiles and each situated profile contains a
number of profiles corresponding to the number of 
attributes in a case. In a numerical dataset for 
example, a profile for a given attribute could be the 
minimum and maximum values for that attribute. 
After RDR generates a model, it is passed to the 
outlier detector. RDM has two outlier detection 
functions:  the Outlier Estimation with Backward 
Adaptation (OEBA) for continuous attributes and the 
Outlier Detection for Categorical Attributes (OECA) 
for discrete attributes [13].
In OEBA, a case’s attribute profiles are grouped as a 
Situated Profile and organised according to the 
conclusions generated by RDR. For example, an 
OEBA Situated Profile will contain minimum and 
maximum values for each attribute for the 
corresponding RDR classification. For each 
classification produced by RDR, a Model comprising 
the Situated Profile(s) is returned to the outlier 
detection component. A Range Probability for each 
profile in the Situated Profile is then calculated. A 
range Probability indicates the likelihood of the case 
value being a part of the profile. Depending on the 
case values’ similarity or difference to the each 
profile’s upper and lower bound, and whether the 
Range Probability is less or greater than a set 
threshold, an outlier is flagged. For this project, if 
outliers are identified in more than 2/5 of a case’s 
attributes, then an anomaly is flagged. Ideally, an 
anomaly should be only flagged for incorrect 
classifications by RDR. If an outlier was flagged 
incorrectly, then Backward Adaptability adjusts the 
appropriate profiles’ minimum and maximum values. 
In OECA, each profile keeps a set of an attribute’s 
observed values and a corresponding M value. The M
value is computed for each attribute value and 
denotes a probability of the value being observed 
after v other values from k observations [9].  A New 
Value Ratio (NVR) is also computed for each case 
value and the returned profile. The NVR is the ratio 
of the current attribute’s M value and the M value for 
the last updated value in the profile [9].  An anomaly 
is flagged when the NVR of a case is greater than a 
set threshold. As in OEBA, an outlier is flagged when 
a case has more than 2/5 anomalies. Figure 2 shows 
the general architecture of RDM. Ideally, 
OEBA/OECA flags outliers when the RDR 
conclusion is not right. This way, a warning will be 
issued at the right time. As in RM, the prudence of 
RDM depends on the effectiveness of the warning 
system. An overview of RDM is shown in Fig. 2.
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Figure 2. Overview of RDM components
IV. EVALUATION APPROACH
Two common obstacles in developing and testing 
KBS are the difficulty of the process itself and cost of 
actual expertise. Usually, it is often hard (to test a 
KBS) and expensive to get a readily available expert 
for controlled tests [14], [15]. In RDR, a popular 
workaround has been the use of simulated experts. 
Simulated experts have been used extensively in 
testing RDR methodologies [5], [14]. A simulated 
expert is essentially a mapping of the cases (input) to 
the conclusions (correct output) used to confirm (and 
train) the KBS being built. For each dataset, the 
simulated expert loads a rule-set generated from a 
data mining tool such as See5 [16]. Usually, a smart 
or clever simulated expert will have a perfect 
mapping of rules to their corresponding classes. In 
some cases, the simulated expert is not a perfect 
mapping of rules to their correct classes. Irrespective 
of the simulated expert’s level of expertise, the 
objective is usually to determine how well the expert 
system learns and not just how accurate the teacher 
(simulated expert) is. If the expert system learns well 
from an imperfect simulated expert, it will usually 
learn just as well from a perfect simulated expert. In 
this paper, simulated experts with varying levels of 
expertise were used. The results give a good 
indication of the system’s performance relative to the 
quality of the simulated expert. The Relative 
Accuracy (RA) of a system in this context refers to 
the proportion of system’s accuracy relative to the 
simulated expert’s accuracy. This measure 
determines how well the system learns. RA is 
calculated using the simple formula below:
                    =   %                                   (2)
Where SA is the simple Accuracy 
(TP+TN/FP+FN+TP+TN), SEa is the simulated 
expert’s accuracy. 
A lack of real data for the development of practical 
fraud detection systems has often been cited as one 
the biggest obstacles in the advancement of 
sophisticated fraud detection tools [17].  The 
unavailability of real data also limits the commercial 
applicability and relevance of the methods and 
algorithms with potential use in FD. Consequently, it 
becomes a hard endeavour to justify the application 
of a new technique in a domain in which the 
technique has not been tested. In the few cases where 
real data is used to test a given method, the results 
reveal how much work is yet to be done to have 
robust FD tools. The results also indicate that some 
techniques have immense potential in a particular FD 
domain. Two sets of data were used for these 
experiments; the Poker Hand dataset and a real 
dataset of commercial online banking transactions.
The Poker-Hand dataset, available from the UCI 
repository [18] was used to demonstrate the general 
capability of PA. The other dataset was collected 
from log files of a commercial online banking 
system. The de-personalized and obfuscated data
effectively comprises more than 15 features of users’ 
online banking transactions. These transaction log 
files were divided into unique groups of exclusively 
numerical and exclusively categorical features. The 
purpose of dividing the dataset into categorical and 
numerical sets was to compare RDM’s outlier 
detection components, OECA for categorical data 
and OEBA for numerical data. Table 1 presents a
description of the datasets and the simulated experts 
used with them. The table describes the number of 
instances (cases) in each dataset, whether the data is 
numerical or categorical, how many rules the data’s 
simulated expert has and the accuracy of the 
simulated expert. 
TABLE 1. DATASET DESCRIPTION
Dataset Cases Type SE Rules SE Acc.
Poker 2000 num 83 60%
OT_A 1755 num 72 60%
OT_B 1755 cat 49 73%
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The performance of both RM and RDM was 
evaluated using the Balanced Accuracy (BA)
measure. The BA is calculated using each system’s 
True Positives (TP), True Negatives (TN), False 
Negatives (FN) and False Positives (FP). The TP in 
this case is when a warning was issued correctly. TN 
is when a warning was not issued correctly. FN 
includes instances when a warning was not issued but 
should have. When a warning was issued incorrectly, 
then this is a FP [9], [15]. Equation 3 shows the 
formula for BA.
            = (/)/ + (/)/ (3)
		!"!#!
FP.
Tables 2, 3 and 4 show RM and RDM’s performance 
metrics including the BA and RA of each of the 
systems with the Poker-Hand dataset and the two sets 
of online transaction logs. In Table 2, results from the
Poker-Hand are shown. Tables 3 and 4 present RM 
and RDM’s performance metrics from the numerical 
and categorical online banking transaction features 
respectively. It must be noted that RM was tested 
with two d		
	&
			
		
	
0.01 in the first instance (RMa) and 0.95 in the 
second instance (RMb).
TABLE 2. THE POKER-HAND DATASET RESULTS
System TP TN FP FN BA
%
RA
%
RMa 750 418 559 273 57.7 97.3
RMb 621 580 394 405 60 100
RDM 72 934 43 951 52.3 83.8
TABLE 3. NUMERICAL INTERNET TRANSACTIONS (OT_A)
RESULTS
System TP TN FP FN BA
%
RA
%
RMa 372 335 869 179 55.1 67.1
RMb 371 317 867 200 52.5 65.3
RDM 74 1123 61 497 39.6 100
TABLE 4. CATEGORICAL INTERNET TRANSACTIONS
(OT_B) RESULTS.
System TP TN FP FN BA
%
RA %
RMa 1089 59 185 422 30.8 89.6
RMb 1066 75 174 440 35.9 89.1
RDM 1481 195 54 25 81.2 100
The accuracy of RM and RDM in general datasets are
impressive as shown in Table 2. Other tests on 
general datasets using these two algorithms is 
reported in detail in [5] and [9] for RM and RDM 
respectively. A preliminary direct comparison of 
these methods also using public datasets is detailed in 
[19]. Apart from the online banking transaction tests 
reported in this paper, the two algorithms have also 
been tested with specialised datasets. RM has been 
tested in a document management system and RDM 
was tested with computer network traffic data [20],
[9]. The performance of both RM and RDM relative 
to the simulated expert is noteworthy, with an 
average of 88% across three datasets, three simulated 
experts and over 200 rules. RM was particularly good 
on the Poker Hand dataset with average RA of 99%. 
This asserts Dazeley [5]’s proposal that patterns of 
fired MCRDR rules provide an additional context 
about a domain. However, the validity of such a 
context depends largely on the domain (or type of 
data) as shown by RM’s average performance with 
the numerical online banking transactions (OT_A). 
RDM‘s RA was perfect in the two online banking 
transaction datasets. RDM’s idea of homogenising 
cases into models seems to be especially effective for 
both the numerical and categorical parts of online 
banking transactions. The system effectively learnt 
everything from the simulated expert in both datasets. 
In the categorical transactions, RDM outperformed 
the simulated expert with a BA of 81% compared to 
the simulated expert’s accuracy of 73%. Overall, the 
high RA across all datasets indicates that given a 
good simulated expert, both RM and RDM have a 
high learning capability. In terms of the detecting
frauds in online banking transactions, these systems 
have proved their relevance and potential in a 
commercial setting.  
V. CONCLUSIONS
In most commercial systems, a hybrid approach to 
FD seems to be a reliable path as proved by the 
consistent use of a Rule-Based system and neural 
network in most commercial FD tools. These RBS 
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use a less innovative, slow and potentially costly way 
of adding and updating knowledge. Furthermore, the 
systems are incapable of warning an administrator in 
case a transaction with previously unseen features is 
conducted. For an online banking system, the 
potential loss of funds presented by such transactions 
cannot be ignored. The RDR based Prudence 
methods have been shown to overcome the KBS 
limitations stated earlier. This paper presented an 
application of two of these methods in commercial 
online banking FD. Test results indicate that RM and 
RDM are a practical and viable alternative in 
detecting internet banking fraud. The tests conducted 
in this paper are part of a bigger research project 
whose objective is to develop an Integrated Prudence 
Analysis (IPA) method for the rapid detection of 
fraud in internet banking systems. Future work 
includes testing the IPA with more transaction from 
an online banking system. The research work and 
experiments completed so far suggest that RDR 
Prudence presents a potentially useful fraud detection 
method in commercial Internet banking systems. 
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